War Overview · Chinese Civil War (1945–50)
No sooner had the War of Resistance ended than a civil war opened with 4.3 million men against 1.27 million; three years later the offensive and defensive positions had reversed, and four years later two regimes stood on opposite sides of a strait. The last great war with muzzles turned inward decided the China that followed: its military history has ended, but the line it drew remains there to this day.
Engagement Data

| Item | Content |
|---|---|
| Time | 1945.9 (Shangdang) – 1950 (closing with Hainan Island Campaign and Battle of Chamdo; Kinmen Guningtou in 1949.10 marked the other end of the military dividing line) |
| Place | Northeast -> North China, East China, and the Central Plains -> the whole country |
| Belligerents | Chinese Communist Party (Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army -> field armies -> People's Liberation Army) / National Government of the Republic of China (Nationalist Army) |
| Third parties | United States (mediation and aid to Chiang), Soviet Union (the Northeast chessboard and tacit assistance to the Communists) -- the accounts of both sides each have their own basis, and both readings stand |
| Result | 1949.10.1 founding of the People's Republic of China; 1949.12 the National Government moved to Taiwan -- the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have remained divided to this day |
Belligerents (War Level)

| Item | Nationalist Army | People's Liberation Army |
|---|---|---|
| Opening, 1946 | About 4.3 million, with U.S.-equipped and semi-U.S.-equipped units as the backbone, and exclusive possession of naval and air forces | About 1.27 million, mixed equipment, no navy or air force |
| Reversal, autumn 1948 | About 3.65 million, with morale collapsing | About 2.8 million, with land-reform mobilization making manpower inexhaustible |
| Endgame, 1949 | More than half rose in organized units, surrendered, or were reorganized (the bases vary widely by account) | More than 4 million |
| Supply | Rail lines and urban points -- once cut apart, paralysis followed | Rural-area support plus captures (the concrete referent behind the jibe "captain of the transport corps") |
Historical Setting

World: the Cold War was taking shape -- the United States and the Soviet Union moved from alliance into confrontation, and the Chinese civil war was embedded within that shift while still preserving its own logic (neither superpower succeeded in controlling its respective "proxy"; this point matters). The failure of Marshall's mediation (1945.12–1947.1) was a crossing point between Cold War history and Chinese history.
China: after eight years of the War of Resistance had drained the people's strength, the desire for peace was real (the Double Tenth Agreement and the Political Consultative Conference resolutions were once a genuine window of hope -- the possibility of peace did exist, and it did close). The Nationalist-controlled areas were undergoing economic collapse: hyperinflation (the collapse curve from fabi to the gold yuan), corruption in taking over recovered areas ("five gains in office"), student and labor movements ("against hunger and civil war") -- the cities collapsed before the battlefield did. In the liberated areas, land reform (the 1946 "May Fourth Directive" -> the 1947 *Outline Land Law*) created a mobilizing machine of "turned-over" peasants joining the army and supporting the front, along with excessive violence in land reform ※ (the statistical bases and the history of correction are unverified).
Why It Was Fought
On the night victory in the War of Resistance was won, firecrackers filled Chongqing. The hope for peace was real: at the end of August 1945 Mao Zedong flew to Chongqing and negotiated the Double Tenth Agreement; in January 1946 the ceasefire order took effect and the Political Consultative Conference convened, with nationalization of the armies and a coalition government both written down on paper. Outside the paper, two armies that had fought a civil war for ten years had no reason to lay down their weapons. Nanjing wanted unified government and military orders; for Yan'an, surrendering the army meant surrendering life itself -- the memory of the 1927 party purge was present throughout the Party, so the road of handing over the guns first and then discussing political democratization could not be taken; the road of forming a coalition government first and then reorganizing the armies was one Nanjing would not take. Behind the dispute over sequence was the fact that neither side trusted the other.
The Northeast was the first stone that crushed peace. Soviet troops occupied the Northeast; as their withdrawal opened one station after another, the KMT and CPC armies both rushed beyond the Pass. The KMT sought to take over sovereignty; the CPC set the line of "developing to the north and defending to the south," sending 100,000 troops and 20,000 cadres beyond the Pass ahead of time (figures vary by account). The ceasefire order of January 1946 explicitly excluded the Northeast -- the fighting stopped inside the Pass and continued beyond it, and that is how the battle at Siping Street came about.
Nanjing's determination was calculated from troop strength: 4.3 million against 1.27 million, U.S. equipment, naval and air forces, control of the country's cities and railways, U.S. aid internationally, and Soviet recognition of the National Government alone under treaty. The claim that the Communist forces would be resolved in "three to six months" circulated widely in the army (source unverified). That calculation missed two things: the economy of the Nationalist-controlled areas was melting inside inflation, and conscripts dragged in by force did not want to fight a civil war; behind the opponent, meanwhile, a mobilizing machine was spreading out -- in 1946 the "May Fourth Directive" changed rent and interest reduction into land to the tiller, and from then on peasants who joined the army were fighting for their own land.
Yan'an's determination had two layers. One was that there was no room to avoid the fight: the ceasefire order had become void, the Central Plains was encircled, and without a breakout the result would be an enlarged replay of the New Fourth Army Incident. The other was confidence worked out by calculation: the liberated areas had more than 100 million people and over 1 million square kilometers of surface area; once the cities and railways were yielded, the Nationalist Army's strength would thin out when spread across that surface. The struggle was not for one city or one piece of ground, but for the enemy's effective strength. "If people are preserved while land is lost, both people and land will be preserved" was the later summary of this calculus (the phrase dates to around the abandonment of Yan'an in 1947; source unverified). This determination was not fixed at the Chongqing negotiating table; it became clear step by step after the peace window closed in the summer of 1946 (decision telegrams and documents unverified).
The only other road left was the one in the Political Consultative Conference resolutions. In November 1946, the National Constituent Assembly was convened in Nanjing by the KMT alone; the CPC and the China Democratic League refused to attend, and the door to negotiation closed there. Marshall's mediation had already failed before this -- the mediator had himself placed a bet, mediating on one side while providing military aid to Nanjing on the other.
On June 26, 1946, the Nationalist Army attacked the Central Plains Liberated Area; Li Xiannian's forces broke out, and full-scale civil war began.
Course of the Engagement (Four Phases)

| Phase | Time | Main Points | Separate Articles |
|---|---|---|---|
| Struggle for the initiative | 1945.9–1946.6 | Contest over accepting the Japanese surrender; the rush into the Northeast (100,000 troops entering the Northeast); Chongqing negotiations and the tug-of-war over the ceasefire order; Shangdang, Handan, Siping | Battle of Shangdang, Battle of Handan, Defense of Siping |
| Strategic defense | 1946.6–1947.6 | All-out offensive (beginning with the Breakout from the Central Plains) -> focused offensive (northern Shaanxi and Shandong); interior-line annihilation battles became a pattern: Seven Battles, Seven Victories in Central Jiangsu; Battle of Laiwu; Battle of Menglianggu; three victories in northern Shaanxi | Articles from the Breakout from the Central Plains through Battle of Menglianggu |
| Strategic offensive | 1947.6–1948.8 | Liu and Deng's advance into the Dabie Mountains, with three armies cooperating and the two wings pinning the enemy; Battle of Yudong and Battle of Jinan (1948) opened the age of assaults on fortified positions | Articles from Southwest Shandong and the Advance into the Dabie Mountains through Battle of Jinan (1948) |
| Strategic decision and pursuit | 1948.9–1950 | The three great campaigns -- Liaoshen Campaign, Huaihai Campaign, and Pingjin Campaign -- destroyed 1.54 million Nationalist troops in 154 days (the bases vary widely by account); Yangtze Crossing Campaign, Battle of Shanghai (1949), Hengbao, the two Guang provinces, the Southwest; setback at Battle of Kinmen and success in Hainan Island Campaign | Overviews and separate articles on the three great campaigns, and articles from the Yangtze Crossing Campaign onward |
Casualties and Losses

- Military: cumulative Nationalist Army losses exceeded 8 million (including uprising, surrender, and reorganization -- the debate over composition requires distinction, and so does the statistical use of the word "annihilated"); People's Liberation Army casualties were about 1.3 million (statistical bases unverified).
- Civilians ※: fighting, famine under siege (Siege of Changchun, 1948: several months of siege left tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands dead of hunger -- the most painful node where accounts across the Taiwan Strait diverge sharply, and the Siege of Changchun will not be avoided in the special section of the Liaoshen overview), forced conscription and grain requisition, the prehistory of counterrevolutionary suppression -- the civilian account of the civil war is included just as it is for wars against external enemies.
- Front support: 5.43 million civilian laborers in the Huaihai Campaign -- the two sides of the narrative that it was "pushed out by wheelbarrows" and of the exhaustion of the people's strength.
- Economy: the gold yuan plundered the urban middle class ※ (the social trauma of the 1948 currency reform).
Aftermath

- The People's Republic of China was founded -- "the Chinese people have stood up" and the consolidation process of the new regime (suppression of counterrevolutionaries and completion of land reform -- closing outside the period covered by this series, noted only briefly).
- The National Government moved to Taiwan: 2 million soldiers and civilians crossed the sea -- the waishengren narrative and a new page in Taiwan history.
- Militarily not ended: Kinmen (1949.10) and confrontation across the Taiwan Strait -- "this war has no armistice agreement": the present Taiwan Strait situation is its extended line.
- The People's Liberation Army's wartime learning, formed here -- mobile warfare, annihilation battles, political work -- led directly into the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.
How Each Side Records It
- Communist canonical narrative: "Liberation War / Third Domestic Revolutionary War" -- a theory of the people's choice (the direction of popular support as the decisive factor); the three great campaigns form the narrative peak.
- Taiwan side: "War of Pacification / KMT-CPC Civil War" -- a literature of failure analysis (military, economic, diplomatic, and party-affairs schools of explanation; a research boom in the era of Chiang Kai-shek's diaries); the last instance in which the name itself is the position, echoing the beginning with "Second Revolution / Gan-Ning Rebellion."
- Scholarship: the empirical turn in civil-war studies (under the current asymmetry in archival openness); the possibility of cross-checking empirical mainland studies by Jin Chongji, Yang Kuisong, Deng Ye, and others with Taiwan-side archives (the Daxi Archives) -- many of this article's open questions depend on this.
Disputes and Sensitivities
- Why the peace window closed -- the respective accounts of responsibility on both sides are placed side by side (the breakdown of the Political Consultative Conference resolutions, the Northeast ceasefire order, and the National Constituent Assembly as key nodes).
- The bases and presentation of the Siege of Changchun ※ -- one of the heaviest nodes among the civil-war atrocities covered in this series (bases placed side by side, with recorders present).
- The number war over Soviet aid and U.S. aid -- each side's archival bases placed side by side.
- The relative weight of "popular support determinism" and "military determinism" -- canonical and scholarly accounts placed side by side.
- For the wording of the present Taiwan Strait situation, see the position sentence in "Aftermath."
Contents
Zhangjiakou, Dingtao, Xiangfan, Hengbao and the southern line, Xichang and southern Yunnan, and Zhoushan are incorporated into the phases of this article and do not become separate articles.
上党战役1945.09毛泽东在重庆谈判桌上,刘伯承邓小平在山西上党战场上——谈判期间开打的第一仗,阎锡山派进解放区腹地的一万七千人,连同两万援军,一起被吃掉了。
邯郸战役1945.10四万五千国军沿平汉路北上接收,被六万晋冀鲁豫部队拦在漳河以北;打到第七天,新八军军长高树勋带着一万多人阵前易帜——旧军阀时代的"倒戈",从此改叫"起义"。
四平保卫战1946.04八万人守着一座平原上的街市,顶十全美械的十个师顶了一个月——缅甸丛林里打出来的胜利之师,和东北山林里熬出来的幸存之师,在四平街迎面撞上;塔子山一失,林彪一夜北撤松花江。
中原突围1946.06五万人被三十万人围在鄂东宣化店方圆百里的山地里整整一年;1946 年 6 月 26 日夜分路突围——这一枪,通行史书把它记作全面内战的第一枪。
苏中七战七捷1946.07三万对十二万,粟裕在苏中内线四十五天连打七仗、仗仗得手——全面内战开打的第一个季度,解放军拿出的第一份"这仗能打赢"的实证。
宿北与鲁南(合述)1946.12山东、华中两支野战军会合后的头两仗——先全歼整 69 师,再连锅端掉整 26 师和第一快速纵队;解放军第一次整建制吃掉国军的美械快速纵队,华东野战军的炮兵坦克家底由此而来。
莱芜战役1947.02华野主动让出临沂空城、秘密挥师北上,三天在莱芜山谷里吃掉李仙洲集团五万六千人——这仗的胜负手不在火力,在示形与内应:对面第二绥靖区的整编第 46 师师长韩练成,是中共的秘密合作者。
陕北转战(青化砭、羊马河、蟠龙、沙家店合述)1947.03胡宗南二十五万人打进延安,打的是一座主动让出来的空城;彭德怀两万六千人用"蘑菇战术"在黄土高原上连咬四口——青化砭、羊马河、蟠龙、沙家店——半年后,西北战局翻过来了。
孟良崮战役1947.05国军五大主力之首整编 74 师冒进沂蒙山,粟裕从正面战线里"百万军中取上将首级"——五天,全师三万二千人连师长张灵甫全数覆没于孟良崮。重点进攻的矛头被当场折断;八年前上高的"抗日铁军",死在了内战的山头上。
四平攻坚战(1947)1947.06一年前在四平守了一个月的部队,回来攻同一座城——巷战半月、伤亡上万,最后在国军援兵合围前撤走。同一座城打了四次,这一次教会东北民主联军一件事:野战赢了不等于会攻城;一年后打锦州天津的攻坚课,学费是在四平交的。
鲁西南与跃进大别山1947.061947 年夏,刘邓大军十二万人夜里渡过黄河,在鲁西南一个月连歼国民党军九个半旅,然后扔掉重装备、不要后方,千里插进大别山——解放战争的战略进攻,是以一支主力近乎"自残"的楔入开启的。
临汾攻坚1948.031948 年春,徐向前带着五万多刚从地方部队升级的兵,没有重炮,靠对壕作业和坑道装炸药,七十二天把"卧牛城"临汾从地底下炸开——这是解放军攻坚战的"学位论文"。
晋中战役1948.06临汾刚克一个月,徐向前六万人北上晋中平原,四十天吃掉阎锡山约十万——其中包括日本投降后成建制留用的日籍部队,其前线指挥官元泉馨被击毙——阎军从此缩进太原孤城。
豫东战役1948.061948 年夏,粟裕在中原二十天里先取开封、再歼区寿年兵团、最后顶住黄百韬撤出战场——用九万余歼敌和三万多自身伤亡,验证了"中原可以打大歼灭战",也预演了半年后的淮海。
济南战役1948.09八天打下十万人守的省会坚城,杜聿明的十七万援兵还没敢动,城已易手——"攻济打援"的援没来,攻坚的成色却全亮了。攻克济南那天起,国军的重兵集团再没守住过任何一座大城;决战的门,是从济南推开的。
辽沈战役(1948)1948.09五十二天,东北全境易手,四十七万国军精锐蒸发——从此解放军兵力对比反超。这场决战的钥匙是一座城(锦州)、一道岭(塔山)、和一座饿了五个月的城(长春):胜利的辉煌与围城的饿殍,同属这五十二天。
太原战役1948.10.05阎锡山用三十八年把太原修成一座碉堡城,解放军用了半年零二十天、付出四万五千人的伤亡才把它拿下来——解放战争最长的围困、最贵的攻坚,"碉堡主义"的终局。
锦州攻坚1948.10.09两年前在四平交了最惨痛的学费,这一回东北野战军用 31 个小时砸开了锦州——四平学费的毕业考。
塔山阻击战1948.10.10塔山无山,只有一段 8 公里的平地——东野 8 个师在这里挡了 11 个师六昼夜,阵地没有丢一寸;没有塔山,就没有锦州。
平津战役(1948–49)1948.11六十四天解决华北五十二万人,只真打了两仗——新保安和二十九小时的天津;北平的六十万守军和一座八百年古都,是"围而不打、隔而不围"谈下来的。武力立威、谈判收城:傅作义签字那天,中国的城市攻防史上多了一个专有名词——"北平方式"。
淮海战役(1948–49)1948.11六十六天,六十万打八十万,歼灭五十五万五千——世界战争史上以少胜多的兵团级决战之最。它的另一面同样史无前例:五百四十三万民工的小推车。徐蚌平原上其实打了两场仗:军队对军队的,和一个动员体系对一个补给体系的——第二场先分出了胜负。
碾庄之战1948.11.06黄百韬的第 7 兵团 12 万人,在碾庄圩的村落圩寨群里被磨了十二天,磨到最后一个人——孟良崮上"戴罪立功"的黄百韬,死在了碾庄。
双堆集之战1948.11.23装备最差的野战军,用一夜数千米的壕沟,把装备最好的兵团围死在双堆集——沟壕对坦克。而黄维第 12 兵团的核心 18 军,前身正是十四年前在草台冈被红军打垮的那个十一师——同一支部队,两个时代,两次覆灭。
陈官庄之战1948.12.04三十万国军弃徐州西撤,五天之内被合围在永城东北一片露天的平原村落里,围了二十天没打,然后四天打完——杜聿明被俘、邱清泉毙命、孙元良与李弥先后只身走脱。这不是一场典型的攻防战:它的主体是一个三十万人的露天围困场,战斗、饥饿与心理战三条线一起把这支军队解体掉。这也是淮海的最后一枪。
新保安之战1948.12.22傅作义的起家王牌第 35 军万余人,回援北平途中被截在一座钉子大的小城里;围它的人硬是忍了十四天不打——打掉它只用了一天,而这一天之前那十四天的"不打",才是平津全局的活扣。
天津攻坚1949.01十三万人经营数月的环城工事,二十九小时被打穿——这一仗真正的话事对象不在天津,在北平;天津的速度,就是谈判桌上的分量。
渡江战役(含紫石英号事件)1949.04和谈破裂当夜,百万军队千里江面同时开船——三天破江防,二十三日进南京,总统府的日历停在四月。江阴要塞阵前起义打开了东段,一艘闯进战区的英国军舰挨了炮:从虎门到紫石英,一百零九年,炮口的方向终于换了。
上海战役1949.05外围让士兵用命去啃碉堡,市区不准用重炮——十六天战役里最贵的命令是"瓷器店里打老鼠"。为了完整接收远东第一都会,解放军在月浦的水泥堡群前多流了成倍的血;5 月 27 日清晨,市民开门看见马路上睡满了不进民宅的士兵。
兰州战役1949.08马家军把最后的家底摆在兰州南山——一野首攻一日受挫,彭德怀停下来查了三天地形,再攻时用一天血战拿下沈家岭、抢了黄河铁桥:西北最强悍的对手被歼在自己选定的决战场。十二年前河西走廊的旧账(西路军),在这里以另一种方式翻篇——留下的是因果,不是复仇。
金门战役(古宁头,含登步岛)1949.10厦门刚下,九千人乘木船夜渡金门——潮水退了,船搁浅在滩头被烧光,登岛部队打了三天没有一船援兵,全军覆没:解放战争最完整的一场败仗。八个月后朝鲜开战、第七舰队进海峡,渡海的窗口永久关上——今天台海的样子,有一半是在古宁头的滩头定型的。
海南岛战役1950.03金门覆没半年后,四野用木帆船横渡三十海里的琼州海峡,翻盘成功——靠两样金门没有的东西:先偷渡上岛的八千接应部队,和在岛上打了二十三年游击的琼崖纵队。五月初全岛解放;五十天后朝鲜开战——历史留给渡海的窗口,就这么宽。
昌都战役1950.10金沙江畔的一场十九天战役,打的目的是让谈判发生——歼灭藏军主力后全部俘虏放还发路费,昌都总管阿沛·阿旺晋美转身成为和谈首席代表;七个月后《十七条协议》签订。这是"来时之路"113 年时间轴上的最后一役:它以"为谈而打、打完即放"的形态,给全系列的战争谱系收了一个不同的尾。Sources and Open Questions
Sources: *History of the People's Liberation Army in the National Liberation War* (Academy of Military Science, five volumes); *Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT-CPC War and Peace* (Jin Chongji); studies by Yang Kuisong, Deng Ye, and others; Taiwan-side *War History of the Pacification Campaign*; *Report on the Marshall Mission to China*; Daxi Archives (online, Academia Historica).
Open questions: each statistical basis for troop strengths and losses on both sides; composition of uprising and reorganization; bases for the Siege of Changchun; figures for U.S. and Soviet aid; gold-yuan figures; statistical bases for total enemy losses inflicted in the three great campaigns; source of the phrase "resolving the Communist forces in three to six months"; statistical bases for the troops and cadres that went beyond the Pass ahead of time; decision telegrams and documents from Yan'an in the summer of 1946; the source and context of the phrase "If people are preserved while land is lost, both people and land will be preserved."
All images on this site are AI-generated depictions. They are not historical photographs, not primary sources, and do not depict any real individual.